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The Origins of Authorisation: 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 
and International Space Law 
 
 
F. G. von der Dunk 
 
1. Private Activity but Public Responsibility 
 
The issue of authorisation of private space activities, the key theme of the present book, 
ultimately goes back to the principled political disagreements in the 50s and 60s between 
the two (then) superpowers in space, the United States and the Soviet Union, on the proper 
role of other entities than states in space activities. The Soviet Union, true to its communist 
ideology, was squarely against any private activities in most economically relevant areas 
of society, but certainly so in an area of such strategic concern as outer space.1 By contrast, 
the United States throughout its existence has usually presented itself as the champion of 
private enterprise, an approach also transpiring in its space policies. 
When, following the establishment of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space first as an Ad Hoc Committee2 then as a more permanent one,3 serious discussion 
began on drafting a coherent legal framework for activities in outer space, this dichotomy 
became one of the bones of contention. Whereas the Soviet Union would insist that there 
should be no room for private entities within that legal framework being developed, the 
United States principally did not wish to close the door on them legally speaking. 
At the same time, the realities at the dawn of the space age were quite clear. The—for 
the time incredibly advanced—levels of technology required to go into outer space, the 
costs and risks associated with that adventure, and the two areas originally considered the 
only possible beneficiaries of space activities and space technology (the military and politico-
strategic domain in terms of the Cold War rivalry and the scientific domain) ensured that 
for some time to come realistically speaking states were the only potential actors in outer 
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space—and to be more precise: only a handful of states were actually able and willing to 
take the relevant burdens upon themselves. 
As a matter of fact, also the United States itself did not envisage private entrepreneurs 
to actually go into outer space on short notice so readily. Even when developing a national 
legal framework for the use of satellites in the context of telecommunications, the first sec-
tor of space which was to draw private entrepreneurs into the field, the United States 
would develop a government-driven monopoly system, establishing Comsat Corporation 
for the purpose.4 
The mutual need, even desire, to arrive at a workable solution in order not to put the 
whole process of arriving at a comprehensive legal regime for space activities at risk, in 
the end gave rise to a compromise that is best captured by: “private activity but public 
responsibility.” 
 
2. Resolution 1962(VIII) and Private Space Activities 
 
The first legal document dealing fundamentally with that compromise was Resolution 
1962(VIII) of 13 December 1963.5 The Resolution captured in several paragraphs the gen-
eral focus on global public interests in outer space which neither the United States nor the 
Soviet Union had an issue with. Thus, in drafting it the General Assembly was “inspired 
by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer 
space,” recognized “the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration 
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,” and believed “that the exploration and use 
of outer space should be carried on for the betterment of mankind and for the benefit of 
States irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.”6 
Such sentiments were also transformed into operative provisions in the actual Principles 
contained in the Resolution.7 Notably, Principle 2 claimed that “outer space and celestial 
bodies are free for exploration and use by all States on a basis of equality and in accordance 
with international law,” whereas Principle 4 provided that “the activities of States in the 
exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on in accordance with international law, 
including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international 
peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding.”8 This 
focus on the participation of states and the public interests involved at the outset limited 
any potential role for private enterprise, which generally speaking becomes active in a cer-
tain area or field first and foremost for its own, usually commercial reasons. 
Most pertinent to the compromise, however, was Principle 5. The Soviet Union in the 
end was willing to mitigate its point of view to the extent that whomever would happen 
to be active in outer space, one state or another should be held responsible for its activities.9 
The United States and its allies for their part accepted such a formal lack of absence of legal 
personality for private entities on the international plane since at least the principled legal-
ity of their future involvement in actual space activities was not precluded, as long as un-
der the umbrella of a state’s responsibility. 
This compromise found its way into the 1963 Resolution, where it was phrased as fol-
lows: 
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States bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, 
whether carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, 
and for assuring that national activities are carried on in conformity with the 
principles set forth in the present Declaration. The activities of non-governmental 
entities in outer space shall require authorization and continuing supervision by 
the State concerned. When activities are carried on in outer space by an interna-
tional organization, responsibility for compliance with the principles set forth in 
this Declaration shall be borne by the international organization and by the States 
participating in it.10 
 
In sum: private activities in outer space, read the activities of private entities in outer space, 
were legal but always as subject to the responsibility on the international plane of (at least) 
one state, which also was under the concurrent obligation to authorize and continuously 
supervise such activities—“private activity but public responsibility,” indeed. 
 
3. The Outer Space Treaty and Private Space Activities 
 
When, four years after Resolution 1962(VIII), the Outer Space Treaty11 transformed most 
obits principles—considered binding by many as customary law anyway—into formally 
binding treaty obligations, Article VI was to copy Principle 5 almost word by word. In full 
namely, Article VI provided: 
 
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national ac-
tivities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether 
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental 
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity 
with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non- 
governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bod-
ies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate 
State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including 
the Moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsi-
bility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international 
organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organi-
zation. 
 
Also in the case of the Outer Space Treaty, the aforementioned fundamental secondary role 
of private space entrepreneurs was embedded in more general rules and principles pro-
pounding the public interests in space and space activities, focusing (presumably at least) 
on scientific and strategic uses. Thus, “the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests 
of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and 
shall be the province of all mankind”12; and 
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States Parties to the Treaty shall carryon activities in the exploration and use of 
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with 
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of 
maintaining international peace and security and promoting international coop-
eration and understanding.13 
 
Also the other operative Articles throughout spoke of “States” as being entitled to under-
take certain activities, conversely disallowed to undertake them or obliged to abide by cer-
tain principles.14 
The Outer Space Treaty entered into force rapidly, within nine months of the conclusion 
of the process of drafting, and as of 1 January 2008 enjoys the ratifications of 98 states plus 
the signatures of 27 more states.15 Since, moreover, those states comprise all of the states 
important from the perspective of space activities and space law,16 the Outer Space Treaty 
rapidly came to be recognized as the “Magna Charta” for outer space, laying the ground-
work for all legal rules pertaining to the conduct of space activities that were to follow. As 
a consequence, the drafting and acceptation of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty as a 
key provision of that treaty established the concept of general state responsibility in the 
special area of outer space activities in a specific fashion as a cornerstone of international 
space law.17 
 
4. Interpreting Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 
 
One main novel feature of Article VI stood out with reference to the role of private enter-
prise in this context. Contrary to the version of the concept applicable under general inter-
national law, where “direct state responsibility” only pertained to acts somehow directly 
attributable to a state and states could only be addressed for acts by private actors under 
“indirect,” “due care”/“due diligence” responsibility,18 Article VI made no difference as to 
whether the activities at issue were the state’s own (“whether such activities are carried on 
by governmental agencies” . . .) or those of private actors (. . . “or by non-governmental 
entities”). The interests of the Soviet Union in ensuring that, whomever would actually 
conduct a certain space activity, some state or other could be held responsible for its com-
pliance with applicable rules of space law to that extent had prevailed. 
However, the general acceptance of Article VI as cornerstone of the Outer Space Treaty 
unfortunately was far from the end of the story. Partly, this was the consequence of key 
principles being left undefined. 
 
4.1. The Concept of “National Activities” 
A major example thereof concerns the concept of ”national activities,” as determining the 
scope of state responsibility in particular in terms of categories of private activities. The 
concept was defined properly or authoritatively neither by the Outer Space Treaty itself, 
nor by follow-up legal documents of international space law, nor by general public inter-
national law.19 The only, partial, exception was the Moon Agreement, the limited ac-
ceptance of which (certainly when it comes to the major space-faring nations, also in 
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Europe) however serves to cast further doubt on the value of its contribution to the present 
discourse.20 
Nevertheless, the Moon Agreement does provide some interesting formulations. Firstly, 
it more or less repeats Article VI, when it provides that “States Parties to this Agreement 
shall bear international responsibility for national activities on the Moon, whether such 
activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by nongovernmental entities, and for 
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth 
in this Agreement.”21 Secondly, it immediately proceeds by stating that “States Parties shall 
ensure that nongovernmental entities under their jurisdiction shall engage in activities on 
the Moon only under the authority and continuing supervision of the appropriate State 
Party.”22 This phrase could be interpreted as equating “national activities” at least as far as 
undertaken on the moon with “activities undertaken under the jurisdiction” of the state 
concerned, to the extent of being conducted by nongovernmental entities. 
Further interesting clues in this respect may be glanced from two UN Resolutions con-
taining general principles applicable to major specific categories of space activities—while 
their status as General Assembly Resolutions causes them to be legally nonbinding per se 
they may still be helpful in these general structural issues, as any lack of consensus largely 
applied to the substance of some of the principles.23 
The first of those pertained to the Resolution on direct television broadcasting by means 
of satellites, UNGA Resolution 37/92.24 Principle 8 provides for state “responsibility for 
activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting by satellite carried out 
by them or under their jurisdiction.”25 Like under the Moon Agreement therefore, responsi-
bility is directly and explicitly linked to jurisdiction, supporting the conclusion that under 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty “national activities” would likely have to be read in 
particular with reference to “jurisdiction”—the Resolution indeed requests states to “au-
thorize such activities by persons and entities under its jurisdiction.”26 
The second Resolution of interest here is that on remote sensing, UNGA Resolution 
41/65.27 Here, states are to bear international responsibility “for their activities.”28 The 
phrase “their” is even less unequivocal than the phrase “national” used in Article VI of the 
Outer Space Treaty. However, as Principle XIV of the Resolution provides, the latter also 
includes nongovernmental entities within its scope, so the legal effect of this Principle is 
similar to that of Article VI when it comes to defining the categories of private entities for 
which a specific state is internationally responsible. 
Still, the consequence of a lack of unequivocal guidance on the international level re-
garding the proper interpretation of “national activities” was that on the one hand experts 
differed considerably in their respective interpretations, whereas on the other hand those 
states which considered it necessary to implement Article VI, consciously or unconsciously 
(likely the latter more often than the former) picked their own choice in determining the 
scope of their national space laws and acts. 
As to the experts themselves, whose opinions gained considerable relevance from the 
absence of any harmonised state practice, essentially three schools of thought could be 
discerned.29 
The first focused on the word “national” in “national activities.” This approach took the 
adjective “national” to refer to the noun “national,” in other words to a person or entity 
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with the nationality of the state concerned. Pointing furthermore to the fact that Article IX 
of the Outer Space Treaty in a somewhat comparable context—of acting responsibly in 
outer space, in this specific instance by being aware of potential detrimental effects of its 
activities and consequently informing other states that might be concerned thereof—jux-
taposed activities of a state to those of “its nationals,”30 the experts concerned interpreted 
“national activities” as referring to “activities of nationals.” In other words: a state was to 
be held international responsible for space activities conducted by its nationals—obviously 
including private companies and other legal persons. 
The second group of experts tried to make up for an apparent inconsistency in the 
Treaty, that between dealing with international responsibility as per Article VI and inter-
national state liability per Article VII in terms of attribution.31 Since the latter had focused 
on the state(s) fundamentally involved in the launching of a space object that caused dam-
age (in a fourfold fashion), the concept of ”national activities” in the former should be in-
terpreted as referring to those activities for which the state concerned qualified as the 
“launching State.”32 While the result would, indeed, be that liability under Article VII and 
responsibility under Article VI would be attributed on the same footing, this solution over-
looked several complicating factors. 
Most importantly, responsibility focused on activities (not just on launch activities only), 
liability on (damage caused by) space objects where the launch served as the crucial trigger 
for attributing liability. For example, a satellite operator’s state would be responsible under 
Article VI for satellite communication activities conducted in outer space and their conse-
quences. In case the operator would have acquired the satellite involved by means of an 
in-orbit sale, however, its state would not have been involved in the launch of the satellite 
in any sense so as to trigger its liability under Article VII and the Liability Convention—
such liability for damage caused by these activities would have rested upon (an)other 
state(s). Also, why would two different phrases have been used for the purpose of attrib-
ution if the drafters would have aimed at making the two concepts attributable along the 
same lines?33 
The third school of thought approaches the issue from a different angle. It does not look 
elsewhere in the Outer Space Treaty for guidance on the true meaning of “national activi-
ties,” but views that term in relation to the obligations further provided by Article VI of 
“authorization and continuing supervision” of “the activities of nongovernmental entities 
in outer space” against a background of general international law. Noting that, from a log-
ical perspective, it would make most sense for states to be held legally responsible for those 
activities in respect of which they had the legal tools available to control them, and hence 
give substance to such responsibilities, and that such was the approach also taken by gen-
eral international law towards the scope of state responsibility, this school claimed that 
“national activities” should be read as referring to those activities which, in one way or 
another, fell under the jurisdiction of the state(s) to be held responsible for them. Moreover, 
this focus on (applicability of) jurisdiction as the key criterion for determining the scope of 
“national activities” is corroborated at least by the framing of state responsibility in the 
context of the Moon Agreement and UNGA Resolutions 37/92 and 41/65 as discussed 
above. 
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In the context of space, this reference to jurisdiction would boil down to a threefold 
attribution. The first and second methods of attribution would be through the traditional 
general public international law concepts of “territorial jurisdiction”34 and “personal juris-
diction” (jurisdiction over those persons, natural and legal, that enjoyed the nationality of 
the state concerned).35 In other words, to the extent that activities in outer space were con-
ducted from a state’s territory (elements of manned space flight operations excepted, all 
activities in outer space are still principally conducted from the Earth), that state should be 
held responsible since territorial jurisdiction gave it the legal tools to actually live up to 
such a responsibility. Similarly, to the extent that activities in outer space were conducted 
by a state’s nationals (including private companies), that state should be held responsible 
for them as it had the principled legal tool of “personal jurisdiction” available for the pur-
pose of controlling them. 
That this approach meant that, in many cases, more than one state could be held respon-
sible with regard to one and the same activity in outer space, should not be seen as an 
insurmountable obstacle. In general public international law, such issues of conflicting and 
competing jurisdiction continue to be prevalent, and legal instruments ranging from “ex-
tradition”36 to forum non conveniens37 and diplomatic immunity,38 and of course general 
conflict of laws and private international law concepts, had been developed throughout 
the ages to properly deal with them. 
Moreover, also under the two other approaches multiple states could become involved. 
In particular in today’s corporate world, companies have ties with more than one state and 
their nationality nowadays even legally speaking may be a matter of debate—should it be 
only the place of incorporation that determines nationality, or also the headquarters, 
and/or main place of activity, and/or even the distribution of shareholders in terms of na-
tionality?39 And the concept of the “launching State” itself, under the second school to be 
read into Article VI, itself was allowing for more than one state to qualify in the same in-
stance—in many cases (a) state(s) different from the state(s) launching a space object 
was/were procuring its launch. 
Effectively, the Outer Space Treaty itself had established an additional, third potential 
basis for states to exercise control over space activities, as a “State Party to the Treaty on 
whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and 
control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a ce-
lestial body.”40 This specific and explicit application of quasi-territorial jurisdiction on the 
basis of registration of the spacecraft concerned should, under the third approach to “na-
tional activities,” also mean states should be held responsible for activities involving space 
objects registered with them, since they are indeed able to legally give substance to such 
responsibility. 
As indicated, the absence of any authoritative guidance on the proper scope of “national 
activities” left individual states, when considering full-fledged interpretation of Article VI 
of the Outer Space Treaty, on their own in determining such scope. While the issue of how 
the various existing national space laws have actually addressed this, is addressed more 
in depth in other contributions to this book,41 it can already be summarised at the outset 
that indeed such national implementation mechanisms widely differed regarding their re-
spective scopes. 
V O N  D E R  D U N K ,  T H E  O R I G I N S  O F  A U T H O R I S A T I O N ,  2 0 1 1  
8 
This remaining uncertainty on how to interpret “national activities” also did not fail to 
affect the issue central to this book, of authorisation (and continuing supervision), since of 
course the extent to which states  would feel compelled to undertake actual authorisation 
would largely depend upon the extent to which they foresaw a risk of being held interna-
tionally responsible for the activities at issue. 
 
4.2. The Concept of the “Appropriate State” 
Unfortunately, the main difference between Resolution 1962(XVIII) and the Outer Space 
Treaty was to exchange the phrase of “the State concerned,” as the state upon whom the 
obligation to authorise and continuously supervise private space activities rested, for that 
of ”the appropriate State.” The former phrase rather unequivocally referred back to the 
state responsible (or at least one of the states responsible) as the one charged to authorise. 
The insertion of “the appropriate State” in Article VI, however, immediately raised 
questions also beyond the fundamental issue of whether the explicit singular used in this 
context meant that, after all, a certain set of activities in outer space could only be attributed 
to one state at a time, or whether in cases where multiple states bore international respon-
sibility there was just one of them to be considered “the [most] appropriate” one to be 
actually forced to exercise jurisdiction, to authorise, and to continuously supervise.42 
Many various options were proposed for determining in any particular case the state 
that should be labelled the most appropriate one for the purpose of authorisation, ranging 
from the “launching State” of the space object involved (again in an effort to reconcile Ar-
ticle VI’s responsibility clauses in terms of attributability with Article VII), to the state most 
closely involved in the activities to be authorised (which of course begged the question 
how to define such a criterion) or even to the state from whose territory the activities were 
mainly conducted (also a nod to Article VII, but this time with the realisation that activities 
in outer space under Article VI were not limited to those concerning the launch of space 
objects properly speaking). 
From the perspective of the present book, all states that have taken up the issue of au-
thorising national private space activities (however defined) have, explicitly or implicitly, 
considered themselves to be the “appropriate State” for precisely doing so. To the extent, 
furthermore, that any coherence or uniformity of approach could be determined amongst 
the national space laws or other appropriate mechanisms for authorisation these national 
mechanisms actually may serve as a customary law-interpretation, through state practice 
and opinio juris sive necessitatis,43 of this key clause of Article VI. 
 
4.3. The Relationship with other Key Clauses of the Outer Space Treaty 
Finally, a straightforward interpretation, application, and interpretation of Article VI was 
and is considerably complicated by its relationship with several other key clauses of the 
Outer Space Treaty. Whilst Article IX has been alluded to in this context, in essence it pro-
vided for a specific version of obligations to inform and consult with other states in case 
one’s own (planned or ongoing) space activities could represent serious threats to activities 
of those other states, and to conduct one’s own activities with some minimal form of regard 
for environmental interests.44 In other words, this clause provided one, albeit peculiar set 
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of substantive obligations violation of which would incur the relevant state’s responsibility 
under Article VI. 
From a more structural point of view, especially Articles VII and VIII of the Outer Space 
Treaty should be briefly be addressed as playing a major role in determining how states 
would interpret and implement their responsibility under Article VI to authorise and oth-
erwise appropriately deal with national space activities conducted by private enterprise. 
Those two Articles will therefore be briefly addressed in the next two sections. 
 
5. Article VII, Liability and Authorisation under Article VI 
 
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty provides for a close corollary to the international state 
responsibility addressed by Article VI, through the concept of international liability for 
damage, as follows: 
 
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object 
into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and each State 
Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally li-
able for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical 
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in 
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.45 
 
The effort by certain scholars to “insert” the attribution of liability, as per the activity, pro-
curement, territory, or facility of launch, into the concept of “national activities” has been 
referred to above. Also, the complex relationship, both in abstract and general terms and 
in the specific context of space law, between the concepts of “responsibility” and “liabil-
ity,” has already been noted.46 
The key issue to be addressed is that liability in space law, as a form of general account-
ability intricately related to responsibility as another form of such accountability, without 
a doubt focuses on the potential for one state or group of states to claim compensation for 
damage caused by another state or group of states—and hence concerns potentially large 
sums of money easily to be visualised. Moreover, such liability includes private entities 
subsumed under those: the attribution of such liability as per Article VII of the Outer Space 
Treaty and Article I(c) of the Liability Convention47 takes place to one or more states re-
gardless of any involvement of private entities in the causation of the damage or the man-
ufacture, launch, or operation of the space object concerned. In other words: one state or 
another (or a number of states) will carry the international liability for space activities con-
ducted by private companies. 
It will be obvious therefore that for states concerned in more general terms with the 
obligation of Article VI to authorise national space activities undertaken by nongovern-
mental entities, attention will immediately be directed to ensuring that the aforementioned 
liability is, as far as considered necessary and possible, taken care of by such authorisation. 
Put differently, states will wish to exercise the control inherent in the concept of authori-
sation amongst others over those entities which by their activities may incur the interna-
tional liability of those respective states. 
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Of course, this was one reason behind the efforts to make the criterion for attribution of 
private companies for purposes of Article VI match those for purposes of Article VII (and 
the Liability Convention), effectively equating the concept of “national activities” to those 
sets of activities for which the state concerned would qualify (also) as “launching State.” 
Apart from the questions which arise following such an interpretation as pointed out 
before, however, this brings the issue of divergence between application of the concepts of 
“responsibility” and “liability” by the Outer Space Treaty back on the table, as it certainly 
also in pragmatic terms impinges on the issue of authorisation of private space activities 
under Article VI. 
Summarising the consequences of the liability regime established under space law dis-
cussed before, four options for attributing liability exist. A state would be liable for damage 
caused by a space object manufactured, owned, launched, operated, marketed, sold and/or 
disposed of, as the potential target for authorisation, wherever that state qualifies as 
 
1. the state that launched, 
2. the state that procured the launch, 
3. the state whose territory was used for the launch of, and/or 
4. the state whose facility was used for the launch of the space object concerned.48 
 
A complicating factor here, is whether “the state” should be read literally and narrowly 
as possibly referring only to a state, or whether it should more broadly be read as including 
cases where “its” companies actually undertake the launch, procure it, or offer their facili-
ties for it.49 If the former interpretation is true, there would be no issue for “authorisation,” 
properly speaking to that extent, since either a state incurs liability under any of these 
headings because it undertakes the activity concerned itself, or that activity is undertaken 
by a nongovernmental entity and hence does not possibly trigger the state’s international 
liability (at least not under that heading). If the latter interpretation is true, however, a 
private company launching a space object may trigger its state’s liability, and the same 
applies mutatis mutandis for private procurement and the use of private facilities, in which 
cases the state concerned would be interested in ensuring that the scope of its system of 
authorisation extends to such activities. 
The criterion of “territory” is the odd one out here, in that it can never be referred to as 
being “of” a private entity, as international law  reserves the term exclusively to the context 
of states.50 In other words, by definition private launches conducted from a state’s territory 
trigger that state’s liability under international space law—and would likely cause the lia-
ble state to exercise authorisation and supervision competences for the purpose. As has 
been noted elsewhere, this clause has provided a kind of “lock” on the system, ensuring 
that there could always be at least one state found liable on the international level for a 
completely privately conducted space activity causing damage.51 That is, of course, until 
the Sea Launch consortium started launching from the high seas, where no territorial sov-
ereignty applies.52 
This evaluation of Article VII leads to the following systematic analysis, for the purpose 
of determining the interest of a particular state in establishing a system of authorisation 
applicable to the scenario at hand. 
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Option 1 (in the broad interpretation) would make a state liable also in scenarios where 
its territorial jurisdiction may not allow the tool of authorisation to be effectively applied—
namely if the private entity “that launches (. . .) an object into outer space,” to use the 
phrasing of Article VII, undertakes such launching activities fundamentally from outside 
the state’s territory. If such activities should nevertheless be seen as leading to the state’s 
liability, the only realistic option here would be for the company to be of the nationality of 
that state—otherwise its launch activities should be allocated to a different state for the 
purpose of being subsumed under “the state that launches (. . .) an object into outer space.” 
In other words: if the state concerned applies its authorisation regime not (only) on a ter-
ritorial basis, but (also) on a personal basis, requiring any private operator with its nation-
ality to be authorised regardless of where the launch is to be conducted, it can still cover 
also the scope of its possible liability under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the 
Liability Convention. 
Option 2 (again under the broad interpretation) presents even more difficulties from the 
present perspective, because of the additional vagueness stemming from the use of the 
term “procuring.”53 In addition to the definition thereof being far from generally agreed 
upon, whatever “procurement” might actually turn out to be in essence it does not even 
concern an “activity in outer space” (to refer to the phrasing of Article VI); often-quoted 
efforts to define the concept of “procuring a launch” refer to “making it happen,” “paying 
for it,” or even “licensing it.” 
One may indeed wonder whether a national space law would be the proper place for 
including a requirement of authorisation before procurement should be allowed, in partic-
ular if wider interpretations of the concept are used (or expected to be used). For example 
in the United Kingdom the inclusion of procurement in a rather extended interpretation as 
an activity requiring a license under the applicable Act resulted in criticisms that this 
would mean that even a bank financing a satellite operation would be required to obtain 
such a license, including the undertaking of possible liability- and insurance-related obli-
gations.54 
Still, one could argue that for any private party procuring a satellite launch to result in 
the liability of a particular state under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liabil-
ity Convention, that private party would either have to operate (“to undertake the pro-
curement at issue”) from the territory of that state or in its quality as being a national entity 
of that state—in which cases giving the authorisation regime a territorial respectively na-
tionality-based scope would suffice for allowing that state to cover its potential liability 
thereby. 
Option 3, the odd one out, results in few problems. Since it concerns the use of a state’s 
territory for a launch, the resulting liability for that state can easily be subsumed under the 
territorial scope of any national authorisation regime developed in the context of Article 
VI’s obligation. 
Finally, once a private facility would come to be equated with a state’s facility for the 
purpose of triggering Article VII and the Liability Convention, Option 4 may well require 
extension of the scope of the relevant national authorisation regime to privately owned 
facilities regardless of their location if the private owner is of the nationality of that state 
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to provide full coverage in terms of international space law liability, since territorial juris-
diction would only cover such facilities if located in the territory of that state. 
In conclusion, if states are interested in covering, through their authorisation regimes, 
also the possible liability they may incur—at least under the broad interpretation—as a 
consequence of private space (or adjacent: procurement!) activities, they would better es-
tablish an authorisation regime that does not only apply to such activities conducted in 
their territory, but also to such activities conducted by their nationals regardless of where 
that takes place. 
 
6. Article VIII, Registration, and Authorisation under Article VI 
 
Also Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty has an intricate relation to Article VI, and hence 
should be investigated with a view to properly assessing the authorisation requirement 
resulting from the latter. Article VIII in relevant part provides: “A State Party to the Treaty 
on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction 
and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a 
celestial body.” 
The Registration Convention, generally considered as elaborating Article VIII of the 
Outer Space Treaty,55 further provides with regard to jurisdiction—more precisely, where 
more than one state could qualify as state of registration: 
 
Where there are two or more launching States in respect of any such space object, 
they shall jointly determine which one of them shall register the object in accord-
ance with paragraph 1 of this article, bearing in mind the provisions of article 
VIII of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and 
without prejudice to appropriate agreements concluded or to be concluded 
among the launching States on jurisdiction and control over the space object and 
over any personnel thereof.56 
 
For the purposes of dealing with authorisation of private space activities, it is important 
first to note that “jurisdiction,” as essentially the sovereign right to control private persons 
and entities by juridical means and notably including the competence to authorise or re-
fuse authorisation, is to be “retained” under Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty. The use 
of the word “retain” points to jurisdiction which somehow already exists—in other words, 
to national jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction, as the two traditional generic forms of 
national jurisdiction accepted under public international law.57 In other words, these al-
ready existing forms of jurisdiction are extended to outer space—more precisely to partic-
ular space objects present therein—by means of registration, and could therefore be 
exercised on board of such space objects.58 
Thus, Article VIII provides essentially for a third legal instrument available to individ-
ual states, next to territorial and nationality-based jurisdiction, to exercise legal control 
over space activities conducted by private players in case they qualify as “launching 
States” of a space object involved in such activities and use that qualification to legitimately 
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serve as state of registration—and to thus create their own entitlement to exercise jurisdic-
tion. 
To the extent that this may reinforce an interpretation of Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty in that state responsibility of a state also covers activities taking place under regis-
tration-based jurisdiction of that state,59 it would mean that any authorisation regime for 
private space activities would have to be extended to cover this category of activities. 
From the other end, the registration of space objects may also result in states better being 
able to exercise jurisdiction over certain categories of space activities for the purposes of 
international responsibility as much as international liability than they might otherwise 
have been. 
Imagine a state being used as launching territory by a satellite operator from a different 
state. The first state, through its territory, qualifies as a “launching State” of the satellite 
thus launched, under Article I(c), sub (ii) of the Liability Convention. If it conducts the 
launch itself, not only will it be liable under Article I(c), sub (i) of the Liability Convention, 
but it will also have concluded a launch contract with the satellite operator. If the actual 
launch has been conducted by a private launch service provider, it will have the compe-
tence, following from its territorial jurisdiction, to authorise that launch, refuse such au-
thorisation, or impose conditions on such authorisation—and it will most probably do so 
in order to cover its liability under the Liability Convention. 
Whichever of the two subscenarios would become reality, however, as soon as the sat-
ellite has separated from the launch vehicle and actual control of its operations has been 
taken over by a ground station of the operator, presumably outside of the territory of the 
first state, that state has no more legal control over the operator and its operations—yet 
remains liable basically until eternity as launching state: once a launching state, always a 
launching state; once liable, always liable. 
Of course, that gap between continuing liability and lack of direct jurisdiction could be 
bridged to some extent through the aforementioned launch contract, respectively the re-
quirement for the private launch service provider to include in the launch contract a pro-
vision, obliging the satellite operator to reimburse any international liability claim for the 
state concerned under the Liability Convention. Such clauses, however, may be hampered 
by their contractual nature and by being limited to liability issues. 
A much more comprehensive approach therefore would be for the state concerned, as 
launching state, if necessary after consultation with other states qualifying as such,60 to 
insist on acting as state of registration under Article VIII and the Registration Convention 
and thereby continue to be entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the operations of the space 
object so registered, in order to control its international responsibilities and liabilities. 
In conclusion, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Registration Convention 
provide for a legal tool to be taken into consideration when implementing the authorisa-
tion requirement under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, being so closely related even 
as to likely have an effect of codetermining the scope of international responsibility for 
national activities under Article VI—although that ultimately would be a matter of na-
tional  space law as the ultimate manifestation of state practice and opinio juris on this, in 
the absence of clear guidance on the international level. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
 
Coming back to the issue of authorisation as originating in Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty, it is thus clear that beyond that basic level of positing the requirement, a number 
of key issues remain far from clarified at the international level. What is the exact scope of 
the international responsibility which any state carries under this key clause, as no doubt 
being that state’s main concern in terms of implementing the authorisation requirement 
and using it for that purpose? To what extent would such authorisation then be able to 
cover also all possible situations where international liability, under the Liability Conven-
tion, may be claimed? What would be the ramifications of one state authorising, through 
registration of the space object, the operations undertaken therewith, on a quasi-national/ 
quasi-territorial basis, with another state authorising the operator of that subject to under-
take such operations on the basis of national and/or territorial jurisdiction? 
While experts have come up with various solutions on these issues, ultimately it is up 
to the states concerned to create the state practice and opinio juris which could lead to au-
thoritative interpretations thereof. States, indeed, are confronted with the need to pick and 
choose from such various options once they are going to draft a national space law unless 
they would like the uncertainties existing on the international level to be transposed also 
to the national level, causing legal uncertainty with any prospective private entity inter-
ested in undertaking space activities. In view of the obvious negative consequences of the 
latter approach, states so interested would indeed be inclined to scope their national au-
thorisation regimes quite precisely (a propos “national activities” of Article VI), to outline 
in detail what liability obligations authorised operations would entail (a propos the obliga-
tions under Article VII and the Liability Convention), and to precisely determine which 
space objects they wish to register nationally and internationally (a propos Article VIII and 
the Registration Convention). 
Unfortunately, as will become clear in several of the other contributions to this book, 
individual states take individual approaches to the matter, making their own judgement 
on which activities they might be held responsible and/or liable for, and which activities 
they consequently aim to control in what manner. This obviously raises, at least in the 
European context, the question to which extent a measure of harmonisation of some key 
aspects of national authorisation, as per the European Space Agency or European Union, 
would be feasible, desirable, and workable. 
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